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of fact, there was fraud or collusion in procuring criminal process.
The result would inevitably be the thwarting of the ideal of
speedy justice, a tendency to impair respect for criminal proceedings, and to inconvenience public officers. It is believed these considerations outweigh the possible advantages, under the minority
rule, of helping to perfect a third party's civil rights and
remedies.
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HOLD BY STATE COURT. - The original order to an approved petition in bankruptcy under the provision of Section 77B of the
Bankruptcy Act' enjoined the state court from proceeding further
with a trespass suit to determine the title to certain oil allegedly
removed, by the bankrupt oil company from under plaintiff's land
through a slanting well.2 Held, that on motion to dissolve injunction it was within the discretion of the federal court to permit the
state court to determine ownership of the3 oil, and previous order
so modified. In re Sentinel Oil Company.
This holding seems unusual since the power to pass uniform
bankruptcy laws is given to Congress 4 and it has said expressly
that the federal court shall "have exclusive jurisdicion of the
The cases likewise
debtor and its property wherever located"'
paramount jurisand
exclusive
of
an
state the same broad rule
point in issue,
the
very
this
begs
But
court."
diction in the federal
namely, whether this oil is the debtor's property and more particularly whether a federal or state court shall decide its ownership.
On this question the cases are not in complete harmony. When
a bankruptcy court acquires possession of the property the general
practice is to try all disputed titles by summary proceedings be-

,11
2

U. S. C. A. § 207.
See generally, Lahee, Problems of Crooked Holes (1929)

13 AMERICAN

Ass'N OP PETROLEUM GEOL. BuLL. 1095-1161.
3 In re Sentinel
4 United States

Oil Co., 12 F. Supp. 294 (1935).
Constitution, art. 1, § S.
511 U. S. C. A. § 207(a).
6 Bz parte Baldwin, 291 U. S. 610, 54 S. Ct. 551, 78 L. Ed. 1020 (1934);
Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie and Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, 51 S. Ct. 270, 75 L. Ed.
645 (1931); Grand Boulevard Inv. Co. v. Strauss, 78 F. (2d) 180 (1935);
In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (1935); Irving Trust Co. v.
Fleming, 73 F. (2d) 423 (1934).
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fore drafting any reorganization plan, 7 but the present decision
is not without support.' It is probably influenced by an ideal of
judicial courtesy and a desire to prevent unseemly conflict between
the respective courts.9 A more probable reason is one of convenience and expediency. If the state court has made progress it is
frequently desirable to let it finish its work10 and adjudicate its
accounts and express"- or liquidate complicated claims'1 2 on the
basis of the inquiry already made.' 3
In such cases discretion permits the use of information already secured to save time and expense in the later reorganization. That seems a commendable practice in view of the purpose
of Section 77B to reorganize insolvent corporations as quickly as
possible and restore them to a normal place in the business world. 4
Bankruptcy was long objectionable for its terrific waste of time
and money. Reorganization is expected to conserve the assets and
create a new and solvent business unit. To do this it is essential
to act as quickly and economically as possible.' 5 Thus when the
state court has progressed to the point of taking evidence and surveys and it is conceded that the question can be settled therein in
a much shorter time than in the federal court, it would be absurd
7 Bz parte Baldwin, supra n. 5; Isaacs v. Hobbs 'Tie & Timber Co., supra
n. 5; In re Zimmerman, 66 F. (2d) 397 (1933); Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F. (2d)
447 (1930); In re Cobb's Consolidated Companies, 233 Fed. 458 (1916); In
re 1030 North Dearborn Bldg. Corp., 9 F. Supp. 972 (1935); MeRaney v.
Riley, 128 Miss. 665, 91 So. 399 (1922).
8 Eyster v. Goff, 91 U. S.521, 23 L. Ed. 403 (1875); In re Kelley, 297
Fed. 676 (1923); Butts v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 277 Fed. 803
(1921); In re Johnson, 127 Fed. 618 (1904); In re Granada Hotel Corp., 9
F. Supp. 909 (1935); Adams v. Pratt, 48 P. (2d) 444 (1935); Moore v.
Hoffman, 327 Mo. 852, 39 S. W. (2d) 339 (1931); Blankenhorn-HunterDulin Co. v. Thayer, 199 Cal. 90, 247 Pac. 1088 (1926).
9In re Maier Brewing Co., Inc., 65 F. (2d) 673 (1933); Bryan v. Speakman, 53 F. (2d) 463 (1931).
10 Park Lane Dresses v. Houghton & Dutton Co., 54 F. (2d) 33 (1931);
In re Community Fuel Corp., 291 Fed. 689 (1923); In re Prairie Ave. Bldg.
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 125 (1935); In re Granada Hotel Corp., supra n. 7. Such
work is of course under the supervision of the federal court.
1In re 211 East Delaware Place Bldg. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 892 (1934);
In re Ewart & Lake, 248 N. Y. Supp. 287 (1930).
'21n re Missouri Gas & Electric Service Co., 11 F. Supp. 434 (1935).
13 A stay of the state action does not result as a matter of course from
the filing of a petition but only when necessary to protect the assets. In re
Commonwealth Bond Corp., 77 F. (2d) 308 (1935); In re Murel Holding
Corp., 75 F. (2d) 941 (1935).
14 In re Island Park Associates, 77 F. (2d) 334 (1935) ; In re Hotel Gibson
Co., 11 F. Supp. 30 (1935).
1I "There should be a co-operative attempt upon the part of all parties to
keep down the cost and expenses and save for the creditors all that is possible
to save, and this court will exercise its full jurisdiction in the promotion of
such intent." In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Corp., supra n. 9, at 129.
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to disregard all these proceedings and start over again in another
court where the same law applies, the same result will be reached,
and the net effect will be added expense and delay. So, to the
normal rule should be grafted an exception that whenever the
state court can settle disputed titles adequately and more economically, it should be within the sound discretion of the federal
court to permit it to do so.16

On,

AND GAS -

UNLESS LEASE -

CONSTRUCTION OF "FORFEITURE CLAUSE" IN
NECESSITY OF NOTICE FOR TERMINATION OF LEASE.

An oil and gas "unless lease" in normal form had incorporated
in it, at the end, an assignment provision which among other matters included a requirement of ten days notice as a prerequisite to
a forfeiture of the lease. The term of the unless provision having
expired, the lessee's assignee attempted to resist termination on
the ground that no notice had been given. Held, that the notice
provision, being repugnant to the unless clause, was void, and the
lease terminated automatically at the end of the term. Clovis
v. Carson Oil & Gas Co.:
In the normal "drill or pay lease", the delay rentals provision is expressed in covenant form, 2 and a breach thereof gives
rise to an action for damages. An express forfeiture provision,
if included, is generally held to operate at the option of the lessor
who may, upon breach of the covenant by the lessee, declare the
lease forfeited, or waive the forfeiture and treat the lessee as still
3
in operation.'
The continued existence of an "unless lease", however, as
its terms expressly provide, is conditioned upon the lessee's drill-

16 This assumes both federal and state courts will apply the same rule in
determining title. A serious situation may arise if they differ in either rules
of law or evidence. For the chaotic result of different federal and state laws
in mineral cases, see NOTE (1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 258.

111 F. Supp. 797 (1935).
2 Perry v. Acme Oil Co., 44 Ind. App. 207, 88 N. E. 859 (1909); Union
Gas an Oil Co. v. Wiedeman Oil Co., 211 Ky. 361, 277 S. W. 323 (1925);
McDaniel v. Hager-Stevenson Oil Co., 75 Mont. 356, 243 Pac. 582 (1926);
Northwestern Oil and Gas Co. v. Branine, 71 Okla. 107, 175 Pac. 533, 3 A.
L. R. 344 (1918); Wilson v. Goldstein, 152 Pa. 524, 25 Atl. 493 (1893);
Leatherman v. Oliver, 151 Pa. St. 646, 25 Atl. 309 (1892); Reserve Gas Co.
v. Carbon Black Mfg. Co., 72 W. Va. 757, 765, 79 S. E. 1002 (1913); Guffy
v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, 11 S. E. 754 (1890); Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va.
143, 30 S. E. 95 (1898). THORNTON, OIL AND GAS (1912) § 151.
3 Supra n. 2.
Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 Ohio St. 161, 44 N. E. 1093 (1896).
SUMMERS, Om AND GAS (1927) § 108.
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